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Predicates such as ‘to be tall’, ‘to be related to Chomsky’ or ‘to know Latin’,
whichintuitivelydenotepermanentproperties,arecalledindividual-levelpredicates
(henceforth: i-predicates); predicates such as ‘to be available’, ‘to talk to Chomsky’
or ‘to study Latin’, which denote properties not necessarily permanent, are called
stage-level predicates (henceforth: s-predicates). An impressivelist of grammatical
facts have been pointed out that set the two classes of predicates apart. The overall
picture is that s-predicates can do many more things than i-predicates can do: there
are constructions where s-predicates are ﬁne but i-predicates are not (e.g. tempo-
ral and locative modiﬁcation, ‘there’-construction, perception sentences, etc.) and
there are readings which are available with s-predicates but absent with i-predicates
(e.g. the existentialreading for their bare plural subjects, the episodicreading, etc.);
some examples will be considered below. A theory of i-predicates should account
for why i-predicates cannot do the many things that s-predicates can do. In Section
2, I’ll sketch (the beginning of) a theory of i-predicates based on scalar implica-
tures. For instance, I’ll suggest that the sentence ‘?John is tall after dinner’ sounds
odd because it triggers the implicature that John is not tall also in non-after-dinner
times, which mismatches with the common knowledge that tallness is a permanent
property; see Percus (1997) and Maienborn (2004) among others, for a similar pro-
posal. The main goal of Section 2 is to show that this simple idea extends also
to less obvious cases, such as the restrictions on the readings of bare plural sub-
jects of i-predicates. In order for the account to work, the following assumption is
needed: that the algorithm for the computation of scalar implicatures is a purely
logical algorithm, blind to common knowledge (the Blindness Hypothesis). Section
1 introduces this and some other background assumptions.
1. The Blindness Hypothesis and Other Background Assumptions
The goal of this Section is to develop an account for the oddness of the sentences
(1), (2) and (3b), which have nothing to do with i-predicates.1
(1) a. ?Some (of the) parents of the victim got married in church.
b. ?John was found dead with some of his hands tied together.
(2) a. ?Every eye of the victim is blue.
b. ?Both eyes of the victim are blue.
I wish to thank Gennaro Chierchia, Danny Fox and Irene Heim.
1The example in (3) is a slight variant of an example discussed in Percus (2001).
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M. Gibson and J. Howell (eds), SALT XVI 102-119, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. (3) Scenario: ﬁve different competitions were held separately, monday through
friday; both Q and A know that the same guy won all ﬁve of them; Q wants
to know who this amazing guy is.
a. Q: Who is the guy who always won?
b. A: ?Each day, a ﬁremen won.
To illustrate the intuitiveidea of the account which I’ll pursue, consider for instance
sentence (1a), repeated below in (4a).
(4) a. ?Some parents of the victim got married in church.
b. The parents of the victim got married in church.
I suggest that the oddness of sentence (4a) can be accounted for by means of the
informal piece of reasoning in (5).
(5) a. On the one hand, sentence (4a) triggers the scalar implicature that the
speaker is not in a position to utter (4b), i.e. that he cannot presume that
all the parents of the victim got married in church.
b. On the other hand, it follows from common knowledge that people have
only two parents, hence (4a) cannot be true without (4b) being true too.
c. In conclusion, the oddness of (4a) follows from the mismatch between
(5a) and (5b).
Thepieceofreasoningin(5)wasﬁrstsuggestedintheliteraturebyHawkins(1991),
and then discussed by Heim (1991). In the rest of this Section, I’ll recast this piece
of reasoning in more formal terms and apply it to (1), (2) and (3). In the next
Section, I will apply it to various properties of i-predicates.
1.1. On the Oddness of Sentences (1)
Each sentence is associated with both a plain meaning and a strengthened meaning,
namely the plain meaning enriched with its scalar implicatures. Following much
recent literature, I will assume that the strengthened meaning of a sentence j is
obtained by applying to j an exhaustivity operator EXH, i.e. that it is EXH(j).
Many of the deﬁnitions of the exhaustivity operator EXH share the structure in (6):
EXH(j) asserts j and furthermore negates a bunch of alternatives y, namely all the
alternatives y in the set Excl(j) of the excludable alternatives given j.
(6) EXH(j) = j ∧
V￿
¬y|y ∈ Excl(j)
￿
.
The set Excl(j) of excludable alternatives wrt j is a subset of the set A lt(j) of
the scalar alternatives of j, usually deﬁned as in (7).
(7) The set A lt(j) contains all and only those y’s that can be obtained from j
by replacing one or more scalar items in j with their Horn-mates.
Thus, these various deﬁnitions of the exhaustivity operator differ in how they carve
Excl(j) out of A lt(j). Here, I’ll adopt the deﬁnition in (8), from Fox (2006).
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cludable subset wrt j iff j ∧¬y1∧¬y2∧... is not a contradiction.
b. A subset X ⊆ A lt(j) is called a maximal innocently excludable subset
wrt j iff there are no innocently excludable supersets of X in A lt(j).
c. The intersection of all maximal innocently excludable subsets of A lt(j)
wrt j is denoted by Excl(j) and called the set of excludable alternatives.
The insight formalized by (8) is that the strengthened meaning EXH(j) asserts j
and excludes as many scalar alternatives y’s as can be excluded in a non-arbitrary
way without getting a contradiction; see Fox (2006) for discussion and examples.
Consider sentence j in (9a). By (7), the set A lt(j) of scalar alternatives
of j contains the three alternatives yFA, yNS and yNA in (9b), under the standard
assumption that  ‘some’,‘all’  and  ‘few’,‘none’  are Horn-scales. Of course, yFA
is not excludable given j, since yFA is entailed by j. Thus, the set of excludable
alternatives is Excl(j) = {yNS,yNA}, since these two alternatives yNS and yNA
can be negated consistently with j. Thus, the strengthened meaning of sentence j
is predicted to be (9c), namely “few boys did some of the readings and some boy
did some of the readings and some boy did all of the readings.” This result is of
course wrong: an utterance of j does not in any way commit to the existence of a
boy who has done all of the readings.
(9) a. j = Few boys did some of the readings.
b. i. yFA = Few boys did all of the readings.
ii.yNS = No boys did some of the readings.
iii.yNA = No boys did all of the readings.
c. EXH(j) = j ∧¬yNS∧¬yNA.
In order to get rid of this wrong inference, we need to get rid of the alternative
yNA. Note the following crucial fact: while the alternative yNS (asymmetrically)
entails j, the alternative yNA does not, since it is logically independent of j. I thus
suggest that the set Excl(j) of alternatives excludable given j should only contain
those scalar alternatives which asymmetrically entail j.2 In other words, I submit
that clause (a) of deﬁnition (8) should be modiﬁed as follows.
(10) a. A subset X = {y1,y2,...} of scalar alternatives of j is called an in-
nocently excludable subset wrt j iff j asymmetrically entails each y∈X
and furthermore j ∧¬y1∧¬y2∧... is not a contradiction.
This little modiﬁcation of the original deﬁnition (8) will play a role only in 2.3.
The deﬁnition of the exhaustivity operator EXH that I have in place at this
point makes use of the two notions of asymmetric entailment and contradictoriness.
Both notions can be deﬁned in terms of the notion of entailment. To complete the
deﬁnition of the exhaustivity operator, I thus need to spell out the relevant notion of
2Or, alternatively, which are not independent of j. See also Fox’s (2006) footnote 35 for an
alternative solution, fully compatible with the proposal in this paper. I have chosen the option in
(10) only for the sake of explicitness.
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knowledge holds, i.e. where people have only two parents, two eyes of the same
color, etc. The notion of entailment can thus be spelled out in two different ways:
as logic entailment (i.e. →W) or as entailment given common knowledge W ck (i.e.
→W ck). The deﬁnitions are provided in (11).
(11) For any two propositions j,y:
a. y logically entails j (i.e. y →W j) iff y ⊆ j.
b. y entailsj givencommonknowledgeW ck (i.ey →W ck j)iffy∩W ck ⊆j.
Which one of these two notions is the one relevant for the deﬁnition of the exhaus-
tivity operator EXH? Here is my answer:
(12) The notion of entailment relevant for the deﬁnition of the exhaustivity op-
erator EXH is that of logic entailment rather than that of entailment given
common knowledge W ck.
In other words, the computation of the strengthened meaning EXH(j) is blind to
common knowledge. I’ll thus dub (12) as the Blindness Hypothesis (henceforth:
BH). See Fox and Hackl (2005) for independent evidence that the computation of
scalar implicatures is indeed blind to common knowledge. Thus, by deﬁnition, the
strengthened meaning cannot be a logical contradiction. This of course doesn’t
exclude the possibility of the strengthened meaning being a contradiction given
common knowledge. What happens in this case? Here is my answer:
(13) For every sentence j, if its strengthened meaning EXH(j) (computed with-
out taking common knowledge into account) is a contradiction given com-
mon knowledge (i.e. EXH(j)∩W ck = / 0), then the sentence j sounds odd.
For the time being, I present (12) and (13) as bare stipulations, and defer to future
work a more through discussion of their status and their consequences.
I am now in a position to account for the oddness of the two sentences (1).
For concreteness, consider sentence (1a), repeated as j in (14a).
(14) a. j = ?Some parents of the victim got married in church.
b. y = The parents of the victim got married in church.
Consider the alternative y in (14b). Let me assume that  ‘some’,‘the’  is a Horn-
scale; hence y is a scalar alternative of j. Of course, y logically entails j. But the
opposite doesn’t hold: in a world where the victim has three parents and only two
of them got married in church, j would be true while y false. Hence, y logically
asymmetrically entails j. Thus, Excl(j) = {y} and the strengthened meaning of
j boils down to EXH(j) = j ∧¬y, namely “some but not all of the parents of the
victim got married in church.” Of course, this strengthened meaning EXH(j) is a
contradiction given the piece of common knowledge that people have exactly two
parents. In fact, consider an arbitrary world w ∈ W ck: if j is true in w, then two or
more of the parents of the victim got married in church in w; since w is compatible
withcommonknowledgeW ck, thevictimhas onlytwoparentsinw; hence, allofthe
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of sentence j is thus predicted by (13). Note the crucial role that the BH (12) plays
in this piece of reasoning, as ﬁrst pointed out by Heim (1991): if the strengthened
meaning were computed using entailment relative to common knowledge, then y
could not count as an excludable alternative wrt j, since j and y are equivalent
given the common knowledge that people have exactly two parents.
1.2. On the Oddness of Sentence (3b)
The oddness of (3b), as an answer to (3a), is intuitively due to the fact that (3b)
somehowmismatcheswiththepresuppositionintroducedbythequestion(3a), namely
that a unique guy won each of the ﬁve competitions. Let me show how to capture
this mismatch. In the literature on the pragmatics of question/answer pairs, one
often ﬁnds the observation that sentence j in (15b), as an answer to (15a), suggests
that the speaker doesn’t know, for each individual ﬁreman, whether Fred talked to
him.
(15) a. Who did Fred talk to?
b. j = He talked to some ﬁreman.
This fact can be captured by assuming that the set of scalar alternatives of j is (16).
For the sake of explicitness, let me assume that this set of alternatives is built by
replacing the DP ‘some ﬁreman’ in j with something like the deﬁnite description
‘the ﬁreman/men such and such’ for all possible choices of ‘such and such’, which
thus need to be Horn-mates.
(16) A lt(j) = {yd( )|d( ) ∈ De
W },
where yd( ) = lw : [[ﬁreman]]w(d(w)).[[talk]]w(Fred,d(w)).
Let me now apply this assumption to the case of our sentence (3b). Its LF is the one
in (17a). This LF corresponds to the truth conditions j in (17b), namely that “for
each day of the competition, there was a ﬁremen who won on that day.” Note that
‘each day’ has scope over ‘a ﬁreman’ (i.e. ∀t > ∃x) in (17b).
(17) a. [[each day] [lt [[a ﬁreman] [lx [x won in t]]]]].
b. j = lw.∀t[[[day]]w(t) → [∃x[[[ﬁreman]]w(x)∧[[win]]w(x,t)]].
Consider now the LF in (18a): since it is obtained from (17a) by replacing ‘a ﬁre-
men’ by ‘the ﬁreman such and such’ (abbreviated as ‘the ﬁreman P’), then the LF
(18a) is a scalar alternativeof the LF (17a). The LF (18a) yields the truth conditions
yP in (18b).
(18) a. [[each day] [lt [[the ﬁreman P] [lx [x won in t]]]]].
b. yP = lw.∀t[[[day]]w(t) → [[[the ﬁreman P]]w ∈ [[win]]w(t)]].
Let’s look at these alternatives yP in some more detail. Consider the formula b
in (19b), which is identical to j in (17b) only with the opposite scope relationship
between ‘every day’ and ‘a ﬁreman’. The logical equivalence in (19) is easy to
verify.
106 Georgio Magri(19) For every possible world w: a(w)=1 iff ¬b(w)=1.
a. a . =
V
{¬yP|P}.
b. b . = lw.∃x
h
[[ﬁreman]]w(x)∧∀t[[[day]]w(t) → [[win]]w(x,t)]
i
.
Let me now argue that the strengthened meaning EXH(j) of the odd sentence j
in (17b) is the one in (20), i.e. that each yP is excludable wrt j. Note that each
yP logically asimmetrically entails j. Thus, under the assumption that there are
no other relevant alternatives, it is sufﬁcient to show that EXH(j) in (20) is not a
logical contradiction. And because of the logical equivalence in (19), it is sufﬁcient
to show that j ∧¬b is not a logical contradiction. And of course it is not, since
there are possible worlds were different ﬁremen have won on different days, where
thus j is true but b false.
(20) EXH(j) = j ∧
^
{¬yP|P}
| {z }
.
a
Note nonetheless that EXH(j) = j ∧¬b is a contradiction relative to the presuppo-
sition introduced by the question in (3a), namely that a single ﬁreman has won on
every day. The oddness of j in (3b) as an answer to (3a) thus follows from (13).
1.3. On the Oddness of Sentences (2)
The account I have in place so far doesn’t quite work for the two sentences (2),
since these two sentences express the strongest meaning among their alternatives.
I’ll suggest that their oddness is due to the fact that, nonetheless, they do not carry
the strongest presupposition. To keep things simple, assume that presuppositional
items denote partial functions of the right type. Hence, a sentence j containing
a presuppositional item denotes a partial function from possible worlds into truth-
values. Let jprs be thedomain of such a function, namely the presuppositioncarried
by j. Assume that strengthening is performed also at the level of presupposition,
i.e. that we can associate with each sentence j its strengthened presupposition
EXH(jprs). The deﬁnition of the strengthened presupposition EXH(jprs) is identical
to that of strengthened meaning given above, namely (21), where the set Excl(jprs)
is deﬁned just as in (10), replacing j by jprs and y by yprs.3
(21) EXH(jprs) = jprs ∧
V￿
¬yprs |yprs ∈ Excl(jprs)
￿
.
Of course, I want to maintain that the Blindness Hypothesis holds also for the com-
putation of strengthened presuppositions, as stated in (22) which I’ll refer to as the
BH′. The BH′ suggests the variant of assumption (13) stated in (23). The two
hypotheses (22) and (23) are an old idea, suggested by Heim (1991) and then de-
veloped by Sauerland (2003a) under the name of Maximize Presupposition.
3I amassumingthattheset ofscalaralternativesusedtocomputethestrengthenedpresupposition
and the strengthened meaning is the same. The only difference is that in the former case we look at
the presuppositions of those alternatives while in the latter we look at their meaning.
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presupposition EXH(jprs) is that of logic entailment “→W” rather than that
of entailment relative to common knowledge “→W ck”.
(23) For every sentence j, if its strengthened presupposition EXH(jprs) (com-
puted without taking common knowledge into account) is a contradiction
given common knowledge (i.e. EXH(jprs)∩W ck = / 0), then j sounds odd.
I am now in a position to account for the oddness of the two sentences (2). For
concreteness, consider (2a), repeated as j in (24a).4
(24) a. j = ?Every eye of the victim is blue.
b. y = The eyes of the victim are blue.
Consider the alternative y in (24b). Let me assume that  ‘every’,‘the’  is a Horn-
scale; hence, y is a scalar alternative of j. Let us thus brieﬂy pause on the proper
semantics of sentence y. Plural predication with distributive predicates, as in the
case of y, requires the predicate to be operated upon by the distributive operator
Dist. Following for instance Link (1983), I take the function Dist([[VP]]w) to be
true of a plurality x iff the property [[VP]]w holds of all the atomic parts y of x (i.e.
y ≤ATx). Thus, j and y end up having the same meaning. Nonetheless, they have
different presuppositions. In fact, the distributivity operator Dist does something
more: it also introduces the presupposition that the property [[VP]]w either holds of
alltheatomicpartsyofxorelseitdoesnotholdofanyofthem. Thispresupposition
is called thehomogeneitypresuppositionin Gajewski(2005) and was ﬁrst discussed
in Fodor (1970). Thus, the proper semantics of the distributive operator Dist is that
in (25). The homogeneity presupposition can be detected by means of negation:
the sentence ‘Sue didn’t see the boys’ conveys that Sue didn’t see any of the boys,
which differs from the plain meaning (namely that “Sue didn’t see every boy”) but
does follow from it plus the homogeneity presupposition.
(25) Dist([[VP]]w) = lx : YESw(x)∨NOw(x).∀y[y ≤ATx → [[VP]]w(y)].
a. YESw(x)= iff [[VP]]w(y) for every y such that y ≤ATx.
b. NOw(x)= iff ¬[[VP]]w(y) for every y such that y ≤ATx.
4One might be tempted to account for the oddness of (24a) by assuming that ‘every’ carries an
anti-duality presupposition on its restrictor, which in the case of sentence (24a) is violated in every
world in W ck. Sauerland (2003b) offers the following contrast as an argument against this account.
(i) Scenario: several candidates applied; some have written only one paper, others two, and the
rest have written more than two. The selection committee decides:
a. ?Every candidate should send [the paper of his].
b. Every candidate should send [every paper of his].
The oddness of sentence (a) is immediately accounted for under the assumption that the uniqueness
presupposition of the deﬁnite ‘the paper of his’ is projected universally; if ‘every paper of his’ had
an anti-duality presupposition, it would be predicted to project universally as well and sentence (b)
would be predicted to suffer from presupposition failure just as sentence (a), contrary to facts.
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sition yprs in (26b), according to which the eyes of the victim are either both blue
or else none of them is. No such presupposition is carried by j, as stated in (26a).
Here, I am ignoring the existence presupposition.
(26) a. jprs = W .
b. yprs = YES∪NO.
i. YES = {w|all eyes of the victim are blue in w}.
ii.NO = {w|none of the eyes of the victim is blue in w}.
Of course, yprs asymmetrically entails jprs. Under the assumption that there are no
other excludablepresuppositions, Excl(jprs)={yprs} and the strengthened presup-
position of j boils down to EXH(jprs) = jprs ∧¬yprs = ¬yprs. This strengthened
presupposition is a contradiction given the common knowledge that people have
eyes of the same color, since yprs follows from such a common knowledge. The
oddness of sentence (24a) is thus predicted by (23). Note again the crucial role that
the BH′ (22) plays in this piece of reasoning: if the strengthened presupposition
were computed using entailment relative to common knowledge, then yprs could
not count as an excludable alternative wrt jprs, since jprs and yprs are equivalent
given the common knowledge that people have eyes of the same color.
2. Application to Individual-Level Predicates
Let me assume that there is no relevant grammatical difference between s- and i-
predicates, contra Kratzer (1995), Diesing (1992), Chierchia (1995). For example,
thereis no differencewith respect to thereconstructionpossibilitiesoftheirsubjects
or with respect to their argumental structure, namely:
(27) Both ‘tall’ and ‘available’ have a davidsonian argument which, for the sake
of simplicity, I will na¨ ıvely take to range over times t∈T .
What is the relevant difference between s- and i-predicates, then? I assume that all
that’s special about an i-predicate such as ‘tall’ is (28), which crudely captures the
intuition that i-predicates denote permanent properties.
(28) For every world w∈W ck compatible with common knowledge, for every
individuald∈De and forevery timet′∈T , if [[tall]]w(d,t′), then [[tall]]w(d,t)
for every time t in the life span inw(d, ) of d in w.
Asnotedatthebeginning,atheoryofi-predicatesshouldaccountforwhyi-predicates
cannot do the many things that s-predicates can do. I want to suggest that, under
assumptions (27) and (28), such a theory is a theorem of the more general theory
of oddness sketched in Section 1. Namely, that those many things that i-predicates
cannot do would correspond to truth-conditions whose strengthened meaning (or
strengthened presupposition), computed accordingly to the BH (or the BH′), would
be a contradiction given common knowledge (28), and are thus ruled out by (13)
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and show that they can be accounted for in the same way I have accounted above
for the oddness of (1), (2) and (3b), respectively.
2.1. Locative and Temporal Modiﬁcation
Contrary to s-predicates, i-predicates (often) ban locative and temporal modiﬁca-
tion, as shown by the different status of the two sentences (29).
(29) a. John is available after dinner.
b. ?John is tall after dinner.
The truth conditions of the ﬁne sentence (29a), with the habitual s-predicate ‘avail-
able’, are usually taken to be those in (30a). These truth-conditions contain a
generic operator GENt which ranges over times and takes two arguments. Its ﬁrst
argument, called the restrictive clause, is the set of those times which satisfy the
contextually supplied restriction C and furthermore are after-dinner times. The sec-
ond argument of the generic operator, called its nuclear scope, is the set of those
times at which John is available. Thus, (30a) says that “for every after-dinner timet
which satisﬁes C, John is available at that time t.” Under the assumption that there
is no difference between s- and i-predicates, the same truth-conditions should be
available also for sentence (29b), with the i-predicate ‘tall’. I have written them
down as j in (30b). Thus, the problem of accounting for the oddness of (29b) boils
down to the problem of ruling out j in (30b). Let me now show that these truth
conditions j in (30b) can be ruled out in the same way as I have ruled out the odd
sentences (1) in Section 1.
(30) a. lw.GENt
￿
Cw(j,t)∧[[after-dinner]]w(t)
￿￿
[[available]]w(j,t)
￿
.
b. j = lw.GENt
￿
Cw(j,t)∧[[after-dinner]]w(t)
￿￿
[[tall]]w(j,t)
￿
.
Consider (31a), with the truth-conditions y in (31b). Note that y is obtained from
j bymodifyingtherestrictiveclauseofthegenericoperator. Letmeassumethatthe
restrictive clause can be modiﬁed without falling out of the set of scalar alternatives
of j. This assumption is supported by the fact that sentence (29a) does indeed
trigger the implicature that it is false (or that the speaker doesn’t know) that John is
available in non-after-dinner times. Thus, y is a scalar alternative of j.
(31) a. John is tall.
b. y . = lw.GENt
￿
inw(j,t)
￿￿
[[tall]]w(j,t)
￿
.
Of course, y logically entails j. Furthermore, j does not logically entail y: in
fact, consider a world (not in W ck) where John is tall only after dinner and note
that j is true but y false in such a world. Under the assumption that y is the only
relevant alternative5 of j, Excl(j) ={y} and the strengthened meaning of j boils
down to EXH(j) = j ∧¬y, namely that “John is tall only after-dinner.” Of course,
5This is not quite true, since I should consider any possible modiﬁcationof the restrictive clause;
it is straightforward to check that this simpliﬁcation doesn’t affect the proposal.
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(28): if John is tall at after-dinner times in w and if w is in W ck, then John is tall
through out his entire life span in w. Thus, j in (30b) is ruled out by (13).6
2.2. Existential Bare Plural Subjects
The bare plural subject (henceforth: BPS) ‘ﬁremen’ of the s-predicate ‘available’ in
(32a) admits both the generic and the existential reading; the BPS of the i-predicate
‘tall’ in (32b) instead lacks the existential reading and only allows the generic one.
(32) a. Firemen are available. ∃-BPS, GEN-BPS
b. Firemen are tall. ∗∃-BPS, GEN-BPS
Let me assume that the truth-conditions for the existential reading of the BPS ‘ﬁre-
men’ in (32a) are those in (33c) (where Cw([[ﬁremen]]w,t) is some contextually rel-
evant set of times where ﬁremen are present), namely that “for every time t which
satisﬁes C, there is a ﬁreman x who is available at t.” Note that the generic operator
GENt has wide scope over the existential operator ∃x in (33c). I assume that this
scope conﬁguration is the only possible one. I take this to be an instance of a more
general property of existential bare plurals: that they always select the narrowest
possible scope; see Carlson (1977). That GENt > ∃x is the only scope conﬁgura-
tion, follows from any proper theory of bare plurals, such as the Heimian semantics
adopted in Diesing (1992) or the semantics developed in Chierchia (1995, 1998).
To develop my proposal, I need the latter; here is a sketch.
(33) a. [ﬁremen [lx [GEN [x available]]]].
b. lw.[[ﬁremen]]w ∈ lx.GENt[Cw(x,t)][[[available]]w(x,t)].
c. lw.GENt[Cw([[ﬁremen]]w,t)][∃x[[[ﬁremen]]w(x)∧[[available]]w(x,t)]].
Assume that the LF of our sentence (32a) is (33a), which is straightforwardly
mapped onto the truth-conditions (33b). Assume that bare plurals denote kinds.
Whathappenswhenthepredicate[[available]]w issaturatedwiththekind[[ﬁremen]]w?
Since [[available]]w is a predicate true of ordinary individuals and ‘ﬁremen’ denotes
a kind, the computation is stuck. Chierchia suggests that the mismatch is solved
by means of the type shifter Derived Kind Predication    DKP in (34). The exis-
tential quantiﬁcation over ﬁremen in (33c) is brought about by resorting to    DKP
in order to solve the mismatch between the kind [[ﬁremen]]w and the predicate of
ordinary individuals [[available]]w. Just as any other type shifting device,    DKP is
only triggered by a mismatch. In other words,    DKP is only triggered in the very
6Note that i-predicates do not always ban temporal modiﬁcation: although sentence (29b) with
the temporal modiﬁer ‘after dinner’ sounds odd, a sentence such as ‘John knows Latin since he was
ﬁfteen’, with the temporal modiﬁer ‘since he was ﬁfteen’, sounds ﬁne. This contrast is difﬁcult
to derive in frameworks which attribute the oddness of (29b) to some syntactic peculiarity of i-
predicates, such as the ones by Kratzer (1995) and Chierchia (1995). However, this contrast is
predicted by the account just sketched: the strengthened meaning of the latter sentence, namely that
“John knows Latin only since he was ﬁfteen”, is compatible with common knowledge, contrary to
the strengthened meaning of sentence (29b), namely that “John is tall only after dinner.”
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predicate [[available]]w. Thus, existential bare plurals always have the narrowest
possible scope because of the “last resort” nature of    DKP.
(34) For every predicate of ordinary individuals P:
 P DKP
. = lxk.∃yo[yo ≤ xk∧P(yo)]
where: xk is a variable over kinds, yo is a variable over ordinary individuals
and ≤ is the relation which holds between a kind and one of its instances.
Under the assumption that there are no grammatical differences between s- and i-
predicates, the same LF and truth-conditions should be available also for sentence
(32b), as stated in (35). Thus, the problem of accounting for the lack of the existen-
tial reading of the BPS ‘ﬁremen’ of the i-predicate ‘tall’ in (32b) boils down to the
problem of ruling out j in (35c), with narrow scope existential quantiﬁcation over
ﬁremen. Note that these truth conditions are formally analogous to those in (17b)
in Section 1. Let me thus argue that these truth conditions j in (35b) can be ruled
out in the same way I have ruled out those in (17b).
(35) a. [ﬁremen [lx [GEN [x tall]]]].
b. lw.[[ﬁremen]]w ∈ lx.GENt[Cw(x,t)][[[tall]]w(x,t)].
c. j = lw.GENt[C([[ﬁremen]]w,t)][∃x[[[ﬁremen]]w(x)∧[[tall]]w(x,t)]].
Let me assume that  ‘ﬁremen’,‘the ﬁremen such and such’  is a Horn-scale. Con-
sidertheLFin(36a): sinceitisobtainedfromtheLFin(35a)byreplacing‘ﬁremen’
with ‘the ﬁremen such and such’ (here abbreviated as ‘the ﬁremen P’), the LF (36a)
is a scalar alternative of the LF (35a). The LF (36a) yields the truth-conditions
in (36b), where the default distributivity operator Dist has been used to perform
distributive predication. By virtue of the homogeneity presupposition of Dist in
(25), these truth conditions can be made explicit as in (36c), where I have used the
shorthand [[the ﬁremen P]]w . = d(w).
(36) a. [[the ﬁremen P] [lx [GEN [x tall]]]].
b. lw.[[the ﬁremen P]]w ∈ Dist
￿
lx.GENt[inw(x,t)][[[tall]]w(x,t)]
￿
.
c. yP
. = lw : YES(w)∨NO(w).
V
x≤ATd(w)GENt[inw(x,t)][[[tall]]w(x,t)]
i. YES(w) = 1 iff GENt[inw(x,t)][[[tall]]w(x,t)] for every x s.t. x ≤ATdw
ii.NO(w) = 1 iff ¬GENt[inw(x,t)][[[tall]]w(x,t)] for every x s.t. x ≤ATdw
Let’s consider these yP’s in some more detail. In particular, let’s consider b in
(37b), which is roughly as j in (35b) only with the opposite scope conﬁguration
∃x > GENt, and let me establish the logical equivalence stated in (37). Let me show
that, if ¬b(w)=1, then a(w)=1. By contradiction, suppose a(w) =1. Hence there
is at least one yP which is either true or undeﬁned in w. This in turn means that
there must exist at least one ﬁremen in w who is tall throughout his entire life span
in w. Hence, b(w)=1, contradicting the hypothesis. Let me now show that, if
a(w)=1, then ¬b(w)=1. Consider an arbitrary ﬁreman in w, say John. Of course,
there is some P such that John ≤ AT[[the ﬁremen P]]w (and, furthermore, such that
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hypothesis a(w)=1, i.e. yP(w)=. By virtue of the homogeneity presupposition
(25) introduced by the distributive operator Dist, yP(w)= iff for every x such that
x ≤AT[[the ﬁremen P]]w, x is not tall throughout his entire life span in w. Hence in
particular the ﬁreman John is not tall throughout his entire life span in w. Since this
reasoningcan berepeated foreveryotherﬁreman inwbesidesJohn, then¬b(w)=1.
The logical equivalence in (37) is thus established.
(37) For every world w∈W : a(w)=1 iff ¬b(w)=1.
a. a =
V
{¬yP|yP
a →W j}.
b. b = lw.∃x[[[ﬁreman]]w(x)∧GENt[inw(x,t)][[[tall]]w(x,t)]].
Let me now argue that the strengthened meaning of j is the one in (38), i.e. that
all yP’s (which asymmetrically entail j) are excludable wrt j. Under the assump-
tion that there are no other relevant alternatives besides yP’s, it sufﬁces to argue
that EXH(j) in (38) is not a logical contradiction. And by virtue of the logical
equivalence in (37), it sufﬁces to exhibit a world where j∧¬b is true.
(38) EXH(j) = j ∧
^
{¬yP|yP
a →W j}
| {z }
.
a
Consider the possible world w represented in (39). Suppose that there are three
ﬁremen in w, namely d, d and d. Their life span is represented with a thin
segment. The thickened portion of each segment represents the portion of each life
span throughout which the individual is tall in w. The long thin line at the top of
the picture is the time axis T ; the thickened portion of it is the set of those times
in the restrictive clause of formula j, i.e. Cw([[ﬁremen]]w, ). Note that j is true in
this world w, because for each time t in the set Cw, either d or d or d is tall at t.
Note furthermore that b is false in w, since no one of the three ﬁremen d, d, d
is tall throughout his entire life span in w. Thus, EXH(j) = j ∧¬b is not a logical
contradiction.
(39)
d3:
d2:
d2:
Cw([[ﬁremen]]w, )
Note nonetheless that EXH(j) = j ∧ ¬b is a contradiction given the common
knowledge W ck in (28), precisely because no world such as the one in (39), in
which ﬁremen are tall only throughout a portion of their life span, can ever belong
to W ck. In fact, suppose that EXH(j) were true in a world w ∈ W ck. Hence j must
be true and b false in w. Since j is true in w, then there must exist at least one
ﬁreman in w who is tall in at least one instant in w, say John. Since w is compatible
with the common knowledge W ck in (28), John is tall throughout his entire life span
in w. But then b has got to be true too in w. Hence, EXH(j) = j ∧¬b is a contra-
diction given the common knowledge W ck in (28). Let me wrap up: the existential
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respond to truth conditions j in (35c), where existential quantiﬁcation over ﬁremen
is embedded under the generic operator; because of this scope conﬁguration, the
strengthened meaning of these truth conditions j ends up being a contradiction
given the common knowledge W ck in (28); these truth conditions j are thus ruled
out by (13) and the lack of the existential reading of the BPS of i-predicates is thus
accounted for.
To conclude my discussion, let me consider the following variant (40) of
sentence (32b), with the indeﬁnite ‘some ﬁremen’ instead of the PBS ‘ﬁremen’.
This sentence (40) does of course admit the existential reading which is unavailable
for (32b), namely “there is a ﬁremen who is tall.” Let me thus make sure that my
proposal does not rule out the existential reading for this sentence (40) too.
(40) Some ﬁreman is tall.
The crucial difference between this sentence (40) and the sentence (32b) I have
considered so far, is the following: as noted above, (32b) is only compatible with
narrow scope existential quantiﬁcation over ﬁremen; this is false for (40): its LF
(41a) yields truth conditions (41b), trivially equivalent to b in (37b), repeated in
(41c), where existential quantiﬁcation has scope over the generic operator.
(41) a. [[A ﬁreman] [lx [GEN [x is tall]]]].
b. lw.[[a ﬁreman]]w ∋ lx.GENt[inw(x,t)][[[tall]]w(x,t)].
c. b = lw.∃x[[[ﬁreman]]w(x)∧GENt[inw(x,t)][[[tall]]w(x,t)]].
Let me thus show that, precisely because of this different scope conﬁguration, the
strengthened meaning of b in (41c) is not a contradiction given common knowl-
edge. Under the assumption that ‘some ﬁreman’ and ‘the ﬁremen such and such’
are Horn-mates, each yP in (36c) is a scalar alternative of b in (41c) (and, further-
more, each yP asymmetrically entails b). Note that in the case of b, contrary to the
case of j in (35c), it is not possible to exclude all such yP, since
V
¬yP is logically
equivalent to b. Furthermore, there is not any single yP that can be left out in a
non-arbitrary way. Thus, according to (8), no such yP will ever make it into the set
of alternatives excludable given b and thus there is no way that the strengthened
meaning of b can happen to be a contradiction given common knowledge.
2.3. Existential Bare Plural Subjects in the Scope of a Universal Operator
Fox (1995) observes that, quite surprisingly,the existential reading of the BPS of an
i-predicate becomes available when the BPS is in the scope of a universal operator
(or, more generally, in the scope of an operator which does not commute with the
existential BPS). Here is one of his examples:
(42) a. Jewish women are related to Chomsky. ∗∃-BPS
b. Jewish women are related to every Jewish man.
√
∃-BPS
As expected, the BPS ‘Jewish women’ in (42a) does not admit the existential read-
ing. In sentence (42b), the deﬁnite ‘Chomsky’ has been replaced by the universal
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istential reading, i.e. the sentence can mean that “for every Jewish man there is a
Jewish woman who is related to him.” I’ll now show that this contrast follows from
the proposal developed so far.
Ofcourse, theexistentialreadingof theBPS of(42a) isruled out inthesame
way as the existential reading of the BPS of (32b), since the reasoning in 2.2 can
be repeated with [[related to]]w( ,Chomsky,t) in place of [[tall]]w( ,t). Let’s now see
what happens when this same line of reasoning is applied to (42b). Consider its LF
(43a), obtained by leaving ‘Jewish women’ in [Spec, IP] and by adjoining ‘every
Jewish man’ to VP by QR. This LF yields the truth-conditions in (43b), which in
turn are equivalent to j in (43c) through    DKP, as discussed above. These truth
conditions j correctly capture the reading of sentence (42b) we are after. Thus, let
me show that my proposal does not rule out these truth conditions j.
(43) a. [[Jewish women] [lx [[every Jewish man] ly [x related to y]]]].
b. lw.[[women]]w∈lx.
h
[[every man]]w∋ly.GENt[Cw(x,y,t)][[[related]]w(x,y,t)]
i
.
c. j =lw.[[every man]]w∋ly.
h
GENt[C([[women]]w,y,t)][∃x[[[women]]w(x)∧[[related]]w(x,y,t)]]
i
.
By replacing ‘Jewish women’ with ‘the Jewish women such and such’ in (43a),
we get (44a). The latter yields the truth conditions in (44b), where the distribu-
tive operator Dist has to be used in order to perform distributive predication. Truth
conditions (44b) are in turn equivalent to yP in (44c), due to the homogeneity pre-
supposition (25) of Dist (I am using again the shorthand dw . = [[the women P]]w).
(44) a. [[The Jewish women P] [lx [[every Jewish man] ly [x related to y]]]].
b. lw.[[the women P]]w∈Dist
￿
lx.
h
[[every man]]w∋ly.GENt[Cw(x,y,t)][[[related]]w(x,y,t)]
i￿
.
c. yP = lw : YES(w)∨NO(w).YES(w).
i. YES(w)=1 iff OMNI-RELATEDw(x) for every x s.t. x ≤ATdw,
ii.NO(w)=1 iff ¬OMNI-RELATEDw(x) for every x s.t. x ≤ATdw,
iii.OMNI-RELATEDw(x) . =
. = [[every Jewish man]]w ∋ ly.GENt[Cw(x,y,t)][[[related]]w(x,y,t)].
Note that the logical equivalencein (45) holds, as can be veriﬁed in the same way as
I did abovefor the equivalence(37).7 Note thefollowingcrucial difference between
7For the sake of explicitness, let me verify (45) explicitly. First, let me show that, if ¬b(w)=
1, then a(w)=1. By contradiction, suppose a(w) =1. Hence there is at least one yP which is
either true or undeﬁned in w. This in turn means that there must exist at least a Jewish woman
in w, say Mary, such that OMNI-RELATEDw(Mary)=, i.e. Mary is related to every Jewish man
in w. Hence, b(w)=1, contradicting the hypothesis. Let me now show that, if a(w)=1, then
¬b(w)=1. Consider an arbitrary Jewish woman in w, say Mary. Of course, there is some P such
that Mary ≤ AT [[the women P]]w (and, furthermore, such that yP asymmetrically entails j). Note
that yP must be false in w, because of the hypothesis a(w)=1, i.e. yP(w)=. By virtue of the
homogeneity presupposition, yP(w)= iff for every x such that x ≤AT[[the women P]]w, it happens
that ¬OMNI-RELATEDw(x)=, i.e. x is not related to every Jewish man in w. Hence in particular the
Jewish women Mary is not related to every Jewish man in w. Since this reasoning can be repeated
for every other Jewish woman in w besides Mary, then ¬b(w)=1. The logical equivalence in (45) is
thus established.
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scope not only over the generic operator but also over ‘every Jewish man’ (whose
denotation I am representing here just as ∀y).
(45) For every world w∈W : a(w)=1 iff ¬b(w)=1.
a. a =
V
{¬yP|yP
a →W j}.
b. b = lw.∃x
h
[[woman]]w(x)∧∀y
h
GENt[Cw(x,y,t)][[[related]]w(x,y,t)]
ii
.
Let me now argue that the strengthened meaning EXH(j) of j is the one in (46).
i.e. that all the alternatives yP in (44b) are excludable wrt j in (43b). Under
the assumption that there are no other relevant alternatives besides yP’s, it sufﬁces
to argue that EXH(j) in (46) is not a logical contradiction. And by virtue of the
equivalence in (45), it sufﬁces to show that j ∧¬b is not a logical contradiction.
(46) EXH(j) = j ∧
^
{¬yP|yP
a →W j}
| {z }
.
a
To this end, consider the following possible world w: there are only two Jewish
men a and a and two Jewish women b and b in w; furthermore, the woman b is
related only to the man a and the woman b is related only to the man a. Note that
j istruein such a worldw (with ajudiciouschoiceoftherestrictiveclauseC), since
for every Jewish man there is a Jewish woman related to him. Note furthermore that
b is false in such a world w, since there is no Jewish woman related to every Jewish
man. Thus, j ∧¬b is true in such a world w and EXH(j) = j ∧¬b. Note now that
such a world w could very well be compatible with the common knowledge W ck in
(28). Hence, the strengthened meaning EXH(j) of j in (43b) is not a contradiction
given common knowledge and the existential reading for the BPS of (42b) is not
ruled out by (13).8
Themodiﬁcationsuggestedin(10)hasn’tplayedanyrolein thepapersofar;
but it does play a crucial role to secure the latter result; here is why. Consider the
alternatives in (47) for every P, which are obtained from (43a) by replacing ‘Jewish
women’ by ‘the Jewish women such and such’ and furthermore ‘every Jewish man’
by ‘some Jewish man’. Of course, (47) is a scalar alternative of j in (43c) for each
P. It is easy to check that all these alternatives (47) can be negated consistently with
j and that the strengthened meaning EXH(j) so derived is a contradiction given the
common knowledgeW ck in (28). Thus, we need to get the alternativesin (47) out of
the set of excludable alternatives, in order to prevent the attested existential reading
of the BPS in (42b) from being ruled out by (13).
(47) lw.[[the women P]]w∈Dist
￿
lx.
h
[[some man]]w∋ly.GENt[Cw(x,y,t)][[[related]]w(x,y,t)]
i￿
.
8Note furthermore that the approach developed so far predicts that the existential reading for the
BPS of an i-predicate is available in the scope of a universal quantiﬁer over individuals but not in
the scope of a universal modal. The crucial differencebetween the two cases is that modals quantify
over worlds and the scalar item [[the ﬁremen such and such]]w has world-dependence built into it.
This prediction is borne out: the BPS of a sentence such as ‘Firemen must be tall’ does not allow
the existential reading.This problem is avoided by the modiﬁcation in (10), since the alternatives in (47)
are logically independent of j in (43b) and thus they cannot contribute to EXH(j).
2.4. Overt Q-Adverbs
Contrary to s-predicates, i-predicates cannot occur with an overt Q-adverb (such a
‘always’ or ‘often’), as shown by the different status of the two sentences (48). The
oddness of sentence (48a) is particularly puzzling for my proposal, given that I am
assuming that the corresponding ﬁne sentence without overt ‘always’ contains its
phonologically null counterpart GEN, as in (31).
(48) a. ?John is always tall.
b. John is always available.
(49) a. Firemen are always tall.
b. A ﬁremen is always tall.
Furthermore, Kratzer (1995) points out that sentence (48a) becomes ﬁne if the def-
inite ‘John’ is replaced by either a bare plural or an indeﬁnite, as in (49). Let me
argue that the oddness of (48a), repeated as j in (50a), can be accounted in the
same way I accounted above for the oddness of the sentences (2).9 Consider the
alternative y in (50b) and assume that y is a scalar alternative of j.
(50) a. j = ?John is always tall.
b. y = John is GEN tall.
Of course, y and j have the same meaning; nonetheless, they crucially have differ-
ent presuppositions. As argued for example in von Fintel (1997), the covert generic
operator GEN carries the homogeneity presupposition in (51), namely that the nu-
clear scope of GEN holds of each item in its restrictiveclause orelse is falsefor each
such item. The homogeneity presupposition can be detected by means of negation:
the sentence ‘Italians don’t eat raw ﬁsh’ conveys that no single Italian eats raw ﬁsh,
which is different from the plain meaning (namely that “it is false that every Ital-
ian eats raw ﬁsh”) but does follow from the plain meaning plus the homogeneity
presupposition. No such presupposition is carried by overt ‘always’.
(51) [[GENv,...,vn[RC(v,...,vn)][NS(v,...,vn)]]] = lw : YES(w)∨NO(w).YES(w)
a. YES(w) = 1 iff [[NS]](v,...,vn) for every v,...,vn such that [[RC]](v,...,vn);
b. NO(w) = 1 iff ¬[[NS]](v,...,vn) for every v,...,vn such that [[RC]](v,...,vn).
Thus, the presuppositions of j and y in (50) can be roughly spelled out as in (52).
(52) a. jprs = W .
b. yprs = YES∪NO
i. YES = {w|[[tall]](j,t), for every t such that inw(j,t)};
ii.NO = {w|¬[[tall]](j,t), for every t such that inw(j,t)}.
9This proposal is an elaboration of a suggestion by Danny Fox.
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of j boils down to EXH(jprs) = jprs ∧¬yprs = ¬yprs. This strengthened presuppo-
sition is a contradiction given common knowledge W ck in (28), since W ck entails
yprs. Thus, the oddness of sentence (48a) follows from (23).
The situation is quite different in the case in which ‘John’ is replaced by a
bare plural or an indeﬁnite as in (49), repeated below as j in (53a), together with
the alternative y in (53b).
(53) a. j = Firemen / a ﬁreman are / is always tall.
b. y = Firemen / a ﬁreman are / is GEN tall.
In the case of j and y in (53), the Q-adverbs GEN and ‘always’ are quantifying
both over times and over ﬁremen (see Diesing (1992) or Chierchia (1995) for dis-
cussion). Thus, the homogeneity presupposition for y yields (54b) in this case.
(54) a. jprs = W .
b. yprs = YES∪NO
i. YES = {w|[[tall]](x,t), for every x,t such that [[ﬁremen]]w(x) and inw(x,t)}
ii.NO = {w|¬[[tall]](x,t), for every x,t such that [[ﬁremen]]w(x) and inw(x,t)}.
Again, yprs asymmetricallyentailsj and thestrengthened presuppositionofj boils
down to EXH(jprs) = jprs ∧¬yprs = ¬yprs. But this time, ¬yprs is not a contradic-
tion given the common knowledge W ck in (28), since there are of course worlds
compatible with common knowledge where yprs is false because some ﬁremen are
tall while others are not. The felicity of sentences (49) is thus predicted. The ac-
count furthermore predicts that sentences of the type of (49) should sound odd in
cases where common knowledgeentails that the individualsdenoted by the BPS are
homogeneous with respect to the property denoted by the i-predicate. This predic-
tion seems to be borne out by the contrast in (55), pointed out to me by Danny Fox
(I am assuming that ‘speak’ is construed as an i-predicate here).
(55) a. Hebrew speakers speak a vary difﬁcult language.
b. ?Hebrew speakers always speak a very difﬁcult language.
3. Conclusions
The following two claims have been defended in the recent literature. First, that the
theory of scalar implicatures must be grammatical rather than pragmatic in nature.
Second, that a grammatical theory of scalar implicatures can be used to account for
facts which have a grammatical ﬂavor. See for instance theaccount for the interven-
tion effect with NPIs in Chierchia (2004). In this paper, I have tried to contribute to
this line of research, by means of the following two claims. In Section 1, I have pre-
sented one more argument in favor of a grammatical rather than pragmatic theory
of implicatures, namely the BH (12). In Section 2, I have shown that some prop-
erties of i-predicates, which have been so far accounted for by means of speciﬁcgrammatical assumptions, naturally follow from a theory of implicatures endowed
with the BH.
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